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Abstract 
This article complements existing literature by assessing determinants of property rights 
protection with particular emphasis on history, geography and institutions in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of 47 countries for the period 2000-2007. 
Random effects GLS regressions are employed using property rights measurements from the 
Mo Ibrahim and Heritage foundations. The results broadly show that ethnic fractionalisation, 
Polity IV and GDP per capita have positive effects on property rights institutions while the 
following have negative effects: military rule, the Protestant religion, maturity from colonial 
independence and population density. The findings have relevant policy implications for 
countries in the sub-region currently on the path to knowledge-based economies.  
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1. Introduction 
 Over the past two decades, the pioneering contributions of North (1990) have 
motivated a strand of empirical studies on the quality of economic institutions and private 
property rights. These are fundamental drivers of economic prosperity at national and per 
capita income levels (Mauro, 1995; Knack & Keefer, 1995; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; 
Easterly & Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004; Pande & Udry, 2006)
1
. But what are the 
                                                          
1
 More literature on the relationship between the quality of institutions and the performance of nations can be 
found in inter alia: Acemoglu et al. (2005), Djankov et al. (2003); Baland et al. (2010) and Fosu (2015ab).   
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determinants of economic institutions and property rights? While it is certain that good 
institutional quality is highly desirable, circumstances under which a good institutional 
environment is protected from menaces of interest groups and political classes are also of 
policy relevance. This is has led to a stream of the literature being focused on the 
determinants of institutional quality (Chong & Zanforlin, 2000; Islam & Montenegro, 2002; 
Alonso & Garcimartín, 2013; Kanyama-Kalonda & Kodila-Tedika, 2012; Kodila-Tedika,  
2014; Kodila-Tedika, & Tcheta-Bampa, 2014), with emphasis on property rights  (Mijiyawa, 
2013
2
; Ayyagari et al., 2013). Two gaps are noticeable in the above studies: on the one hand, 
scholarship on property rights protection is sparse in Africa and on the other hand, the current 
drive towards knowledge-based economies across the continent invites an inquiry into the 
determinants of property rights’ institutions because such institutions are essential in boosting 
knowledge economy (KE).  
KE has become indispensible for competitiveness in today’s World economy. 
Narratives maintaining this position  include: (i) the relevance of KE in reports from the 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank 
(World Bank, 2007; Tchamyou, 2015;Weber, 2011); (ii) the use of KE by developed 
countries to drive development in the global arena on the one hand and on the other hand, 
some evidence of catch-up  by Latin American and East Asian nations which are increasingly 
asserting their footprints in KE (Dahlman, 2011; Asongu, 2013a, 2014a; Chandra & 
Yokoyama, 2011); (iii) the historic KE pattern of Japan has inspired the newly industrialized 
economies of East Asia (Asongu, 2013b); (iv) the South East Asian miracle holds special KE 
lessons for Africa (Kim, 2013; Tran, 2011)  and (v) the overall KE index of Africa dropped 
during the period 2000 to 2009 (Anyanwu, 2012; Asongu, 2015a).  
                                                          
2
 This author has proposed an extensive literature on the determinants of property rights. . 
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 Interest in the intellectual property rights (IPRs) dimension of KE has been 
concentrated around two principal streams of thought. Accordingly, a stream is of the 
perspective that growing protection of IPRs is favourable for economic prosperity and 
development (Falvey et al., 2006; Asongu, 2015b; Gould & Gruben, 1996). Conversely, 
another stream has documented that growth could be seriously constrained by the protection 
of IPRs and adoption of IPRs in less developed countries (Yang & Maskus, 2001; Andrés & 
Asongu, 2015, 2016). The main argument of this latter school of thought maintains that less 
stringent IPRs are essential at the early stages of industrialization in order to enhance 
knowledge spillovers in less developed nations. A core intuition of this perspective is that 
technology in less developed nations is unsuited for innovation, but friendlier to adaptation 
and imitation
3
. In the light of  above narratives, there has been an evolving interest in how the 
protection of IPRs affects economic development, technological progress and innovation 
(Andrés, 2006; Goel & Nelson, 2009; Banerjee et al., 2005; Bezmen & Depken, 2006; 
Bezmen & Depken, 2004; Andrés & Goel, 2012; Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2006).  
 Given the above interesting background, this paper is a direct extension of a stream of 
studies by Asongu and Andrés on IPRs protection/promotion in Africa. They have examined 
timelines for IPRs harmonization against software piracy in Africa (Asongu, 2013a) and the 
World (Andrés & Asongu, 2013a, 2016), notably on: (i) how IPRs matter in the KE-finance 
nexus (Asongu, 2013b) and (ii) the role of IPRs in the fight against software piracy (Asongu, 
2015b).  
 This study has at least three contributions to the literature. First, it extends a recent 
strand of literature which has shown that in the fight against piracy, not all IPRs protection 
channels play a positive role, regardless of legal origins (Asongu, 2015). The strand has been 
                                                          
3
 Consistent with Asongu (2015b), this second strand has prominently featured in the debate because of 
arguments about whether permission for the copying of life-saving pharmaceuticals should be given to 
developing nations that are less likely to afford for HIV/AIDS treatments but most affected by the disease 
burden.  
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broadly supported by Andrés et al. (2015) who have shown that using governance 
mechanisms to uphold IPRs is not a necessary condition for KE in Africa. This inquiry 
extends the strand by explaining the protection of property rights through history, geography 
and religion. Second, apart from the highlighted studies by Andrés, Amavilah and Asongu, 
the paper also steers clear of the KE literature that is not focused on IPRs (AfDB, 2007; 
Dahlman, 2007; Aubert, 2005; Bizri, 2009; Britz et al., 2006; Lightfoot, 2011; Makinda, 
2007).  Third, the positioning of the study also improves understanding of African 
entrepreneurship and business literature (Oseifuah, 2010; Mensah & Benedict, 2010; Singh et 
al., 2011; Gerba, 2012; Tchamyou, 2015; Asongu & Tchamyou, 2016), especially in the 
substantially documented need for investment (Anyanwu, 2007, 2009; Bartels et al., 2009; 
Darley, 2012; Bartels et al., 2014; Rolfe & Woodward, 2004; Tuomi, 2011). In essence, the 
protection and promotion of private property rights are very likely to stimulate investment 
(foreign, domestic and private).  
 The remainder of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
foundations. The data and methodology are covered in Section 3. Section 4 presents and 
discusses the results while Section 5 concludes with implications. 
 
2. Property rights protection and development 
2.1 Property rights protection  
 The dominant intellectual property (IP) literature maintains that IPRs influence 
development in two main ways (Bezmen & Depken, 2004; Asongu, 2015b). A first narrative 
discusses the degree by which IPRs affect the creation of novel knowledge and diffusion of 
existing knowledge across countries. A second stream on the indirect impact maintains that a 
country’s IPRs regime determines factors needed for economic prosperity from international 
transactions.  
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 The ‘creation and dissemination of knowledge’ which constitute the first stream holds 
that the protection of IPRs has origins in endogenous growth theories in which investors are 
rewarded with higher returns (or profit) through enhanced conditions for research and 
development (R&D). This increases the stock of knowledge in society and drives-down the 
cost of potential innovation while at the same time improving the general outlook in 
knowledge accumulation that is needed for economic prosperity (Romer, 1990; Grossman & 
Helpman, 1991; Asongu, 2015b).  
 According to the second stream, a country’s development may also be affected by the 
manner in which it engages transactions at the international level like Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) flows, trade and technology transfers (Bezmen & Depken, 2014). While 
some skeptics postulate that adherence to strong IPRs regimes could diminish the need for 
international transactions like FDI (Yang & Maskus, 2001), another narrative is of the stance 
that tighter IPRs are essential for increasing: exports (Maskus & Penubarti, 1995); the transfer 
of technology and FDI (Less & Mansfield, 1996) and avenues of investment (Seyoum, 1996; 
Mansfield, 1994). In a nutshell, the theory of endogenous growth supports international 
transactions as an important channel for the transfer of technology and better utilization of 
resources (Todaro & Smith, 2003).  
 
2.2 Property rights protection and development 
 Borrowing from the underlying literature (Shadlen et al., 2005; Asonguet al., 2016), 
the principal forms of IPRs are patents and copyright. The latter is a form of expression in 
terms of artistic work or written material whereas the former protects the ideas motivating 
industrial processes and products. The processes of invention and artistic creation could take 
the form of public commodities and become the object of concerns in collective action if the 
government does not put mechanisms in place to enforce patents and copyright laws. This 
‘collective action issue’ is tackled with IPRs which are designed to offer authors and 
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inventors temporal monopolies. The issue arising from IPRs management is the trade-off 
between producer and consumer needs. The trade-off remains very complex, essentially 
because the features of ideas and expressions are distinguished commodities. Accordingly, 
IPRs are significantly different from classic property rights because of tangibility. The main 
idea here is that the consumption of ideas in non-excludable and non rival. In other words, the 
idea can be used repeatedly without depletion by an unlimited number of consumers. But 
restricted use can stifle innovation and limit the production of ideas (Yang & Maskus, 2001; 
Bessen & Maskin, 2000; Helpman, 1993; Shadlenet al., 2005; Maskus, 2000). Therefore, the 
principal challenge in IPRs management is to avoid the deterrence of distribution while 
creating incentives for the provision of ideas and knowledge.  
 In order to strike the interesting balance between distribution and provision, there has 
been a historic curtailment of IPRs. For instance, the private rights to ideas are not granted 
automatically upon possession. Neither are these rights indefinite. Hence, when patents and 
copyrights expire, they enter into the public entity (Asongu, 2014b). In the perspective of 
being subject to a variety of automatic exceptions, the rights to private property are also 
limited. Hence, the use of protected commodities and ideas are also endowed to third parties.  
This dimension of copyright is governed by the fair-use doctrine which enables third parties 
to use copyrighted products irrespective of the intention of third parties.  
 According to Lessig (2001, p. 249), prior to the 1980s, governments in the world 
offered weak and porous copyright protection. The fundamental changes in  IPRs laws that 
were introduced during this period were meant to overcome the shortcomings that 
distinguished tangible property from IPRs (Shadlen et al., 2005).  From an African 
perspective, apart from debates on trade-off between reduced diffusion of novel commodities 
and innovation, there has been a recent stream of studies by Asongu and Andrés on IPRs 
protection/promotion. They have examined:  (i) timelines for IPRs harmonization in Africa 
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(Asongu, 2013a) and the world (Andrés & Asongu, 2013a, 2016) against software piracy; (ii) 
how IPRs matter in the KE-finance nexus (Asongu, 2013b) and (iii) the role of IPRs in the 
fight against software piracy (Asongu, 2014b). The present inquiry extends this strand of the 
literature by explaining the protection of property rights with particular emphasis on history, 
geography and religion. 
 The engaged literature clearly articulates the importance of property rights in the 
development process. Hence, understanding the determinants of these property rights in Sub-
Saharan Africa is important for the post-2015 development agenda because property rights 
drive investment on the one hand and on the other hand, investment is needed for growth and 
poverty reduction. In policy essence, investment, growth and poverty reduction are essential 
in the post-2015 sustainable development agenda because a 2015 World Bank report on the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has revealed that extreme poverty has been 
decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank, 
2015).  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
The study examines a panel of 47 countries with data from the Heritage Foundation and Wall 
Street Journal (HER-WSJ), Mo Ibrahim Foundation and World Bank Development Indicators 
(WDI). The property rights variables are obtained from the first-two sources. With regard to 
the first source, the variable evaluates the ability of people to accumulate private property that 
is guaranteed within a legal framework which is clearly respected by the State. It measures the 
level at which private property rights are protected by the law and respected by the State. 
These include: expropriation risks, independence of the judiciary system, corruption in the 
judicial system and the capacity of corporations and individuals to respect contracts. The 
measurement has been substantially used in empirical studies to measure private property 
(Ayyagari et al., 2013).  
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On the second source, the variable from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation is composed of many 
underlying indicators measuring the same dimension from varying sources or measuring 
similar dimensions from the same source. The underlying variables are: property rights from 
the African Development Bank and World Bank; property rights from the Berstelmann 
Foundation; guaranteed of rights from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) and property 
rights from the Heritage Foundation and the World Street Journals.  The two variables of 
property rights are used for robustness purposes.  
The control variables are broadly consistent with Ayyagari et al. (2006). In fact they 
have been rationally used in the literature. To them, we have added other variables, notably: 
the judicial process, the size of the State or population and independence. Justice is measured 
by the judicial process, which ranges from 1 to 100, with higher values for higher justice 
quality. The EIU data is commissioned by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. This indicator assesses 
the extent to which the judicial process or courts are subject to interference or distortion by 
interest groups. It refers to the measurement of democratic institutional quality in a country: 
Polity 2. This index measures the level of democracy corrected for dictatorial influence. This 
index ranges from -10 to 10, with higher values indicating better democratic institutions. The 
data on Polity IV is obtained from WDI. 
Ethnic fragmentation (Ethnicfract) is obtained from Alesina et al. (2003). Ethnic 
fragmentation measures for each country, the probability that two generic individuals are not 
from the same ethnic group. Legal origin (Origdroitang) is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of 1 for English common law countries and 0 otherwise. This indicator was proposed by 
La Porta et al. (1999). From the data, we have created religious variables in accordance with 
the logic of Ayyagari et al. (2006). For instance, if the protestant religion is dominant in a 
given area, a value of 1 is assigned it. The GDP per capita variable is from Penn World Tables 
while the military rule indicator is from Raul et al. (2013).  
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 Table 1 below presents the summary statistics. The means of the variables are quite 
comparable and judging from the standard deviations we can be confident that reasonable 
estimated nexuses would emerge.  
 
Table 1 – Summary statistics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Property Rights (Heritage 
foundation) 
38.159 14.778 10 70 
GDP per capita (log) (t-4) 7.562 .952 5.743 9.871 
GDP per capita (log) (t-1) 7.589 .965 5.743 10.062 
Judicial process 30.478 31.702 0 100 
PropertyRights (Fondation Mo 
Ibrahim) 
44.517 19.834 0 93.452 
Catholics religion .2917 .455 0 1 
Protestants religion .042 .200 0 1 
Muslims  religion .271 .445 0 1 
Other religion .396 .490 0 1 
Common law  .422 .495 0 1 
Military rule .336 .473 0 1 
Independancy 41.729 18.571 5 160 
Population (log) 8.651 1.582 4.358 11.873 
GDP per capita (log) 7.598 .969 5.743 10.062 
EthnicFractionalization .673 .208 .0582 .930 
Polity IV  -6.323 24.618 -88 10 
Std. Dev. Standard Deviation. Min: Minimum. Max: Maximum.  
 
3. Empirical results  
 The first table of this section presents baseline estimation results. The first-two 
columns of the table entail findings from Fixed Effects and Random Effects models. With the 
knowledge that some variables do not vary substantially while others are dummies, the 
Random Effects model is preferred to the Fixed Effects option. Moreover, the null hypothesis 
of the Hausman test is not rejected, which suggests that the Random Effects model is a better 
fit. Hence, the interpretations in Table 2 begin from the second column with the Random 
Effects model. 
 Many researchers have used cross sectional regressions in order to examine the 
hypothesis of institutional efficiency in which per capita income or general economic growth 
is strongly influenced by institutions. To the best of our knowledge, Clague et al. (1996) were 
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the first to examine the North (1981) and Rosenberg and Birdzell (1986) hypothesis on the 
positive association between enhanced economic activities and the quality of institutions. A 
substantial bulk of the literature has produced results that are coherent with the underlying 
hypothesis (see for example Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002; Keefer & Knack, 2002; Feng, 2003). 
Our estimations broadly confirm this hypothesis since development is accompanied with an 
improvement in property rights. The coefficient is the second highest in terms magnitude. 
Clague et al. (1996) have established that the quality of institutions improves with maturity 
from colonial independence because time helps consolidate stronger institutions. 
Unfortunately our findings do not enable us to validate this assertion from an African 
perspective.   
 All societies may not have the same conception of what is good for their members 
(Weber, 1958; Banfield, 1958; Putnam, 1993; Landes, 1998, 2000). This asymmetry in 
perspective creates intentional differences. Though some authors have emphasised the 
importance of cultural values to explaining differences in the quality of institutions across 
countries (North, 1990; Greif, 1994; Lal, 1999), there are relatively few empirical studies that 
have analysed the effect of culture on institutional quality. Some studies that have empirically 
assessed the nexus have concluded on a significant relationship between cultural variables and 
institutional quality (e.g. see La Porta et al., 1999; Stulz & Williamson, 2003; Licht et al., 
2005, 2008; Nunn, 2012; Alesina & Giuliano, 2015). First, one very common way to measure 
these cultural dimensions is to use proxies that capture religion. This dimension is considered 
in the third column of Table 2. However, this consideration does not fundamentally change 
the behaviour of the variables. Second, only the variable on protestant religion is of statistical 
interest. Accordingly, the growth of Protestantism tends to mitigate property rights in Africa 
while other religions have the opposite effect, though not significantly.  
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Table 2. Dependent Variable: Property Rights (Mo Ibrahim Foundation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Judicial  .398*** 
(.024) 
.399*** 
(.023) 
.399***    
(.023) 
.399***   
(.023) 
.399*** 
(.023) 
.411***   
(.023) 
Independancy  .052    
(.038) 
.033 
(.037) 
.034 
(.037) 
.021 
(.038) 
.034    
(.037) 
.002 
(.037) 
Common law .693 
(1.363) 
.739 
(1.359) 
.820 
(1.385) 
.501 
(1.370) 
.738   
 (1.361) 
1.084   
(1.342) 
Military rule -4.810***   
(1.396) 
-4.952***   
(1.390) 
-5.009*** 
(1.4039) 
-4.239***   
(1.498) 
-4.981***   
(1.455) 
-5.195***   
(1.371) 
Population (log) .151 
(.602) 
-.040 
(.595) 
-.048 
(.596) 
-.235 
(.614) 
-.033    
(.603) 
-.693 
(.615) 
GDP per capita (log) 6.068*** 
(.922) 
5.766***    
(.910) 
5.757***    
(.912) 
5.534*** 
(.927) 
5.776***   
(.923) 
5.275***   
(.907) 
EthnicFractionalization 16.443***    
3.9367 
16.872*** 
(3.922) 
17.075*** 
(3.981) 
17.107*** 
(3.923) 
16.844*** 
(3.949) 
19.987***   
(3.967) 
Polity IV  .1376*** 
(.0269) 
.132*** 
(.027) 
.133***    
(.027) 
.132***   
(.027) 
.132***   
(.027) 
.138***    
(.026) 
Catholic Religion   .463 
(1.501) 
   
Other religion    1.893 
(1.495) 
  
Muslims Religion     .107 
(1.542) 
 
Protestants Religion      -10.678***   
(3.075) 
Constant  -26.536**   
(11.603) 
-22.106* *  
(11.405) 
-22.255** 
(11.428) 
-19.124  
(11.636) 
-22.259*   
(11.631) 
-13.298   
(11.518) 
Hausman (p-value) 0.7223      
R²   within 0.6283 0.6280 0.6281 0.6292 0.6280 0.6392 
R²   between 0.6983 0.6659 0.6653 0.6010 0.6684 0.5523 
R²  overall 0.6226 0.6229 0.6230 0.6246 0.6229 0.6350 
Obs 374 374 374 374 374 374 
Method Fixed-effects 
(within) 
regression 
Random-
effects GLS 
regression 
Random-
effects GLS 
regression 
Random-
effects GLS 
regression 
Random-
effects GLS 
regression 
Random-
effects GLS 
regression 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, ***: significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 The works of La Porta et al. (1998, 1999, 2008) have underlined the significant role of 
judicial-systems’ legal origins in the protection of private property rights or enhancement of 
government performance. Beck et al. (2003) have also shown that developing countries of 
French civil law have lower levels of private property rights protection compared to their 
English common law counterparts. Hence, there is consensus in the literature on the 
advantages of English common law (e.g. Agbor, 2015; Asongu, 2012). Our findings are 
consistent with this consensus. While the effect is positive, albeit not significant, in our 
regressions we have a variable that directly captures the effect of justice. However, if the 
common law effect substantially reflects the judicial process of a country, it could be logical 
to find the effect insignificant, since the variable measuring the judicial process is highly 
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significant. In other words, the common law effect will be indirect when we control for the 
effect of justice.  
 Another strand of the literature maintains that institutions (political & economic) are 
not chosen by all members of the society, but by a group of individuals that hold political 
power at a certain point in time. This group results from conflict of interest. The group that 
emerges victorious in these conflicts provides institutions that maximise personal gain (in 
terms of political power and personal income) and not necessarily the society’s income at 
large. North (1981) has substantially contributed to laying the foundations for this literature. 
However, other researchers have followed-suit to postulate that political motivations of 
certain government elite weaken property rights and control power in order to benefit from 
national wealth as much as possible (Robinson, 1998; Gradstein, 2004; Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2000, 2005, 2008; Acemoglu et al., 2008; North et al., 2009, 2012; Nunn, 2011). 
Empirical studies of this approach are substantial and entail many political, economic and 
cultural factors. Among these contributions is that of Keefer and Knack (1996) which 
investigates the role of democracy in the quality of institutions. The authors have observed a 
direct correlation between constraints weighing on the executive and the quality of 
institutions. Our results are broadly consistent with the consensus that democracy has a non-
negligible role in the respect of property rights institutions.  
Observations from a plethora of authors corroborate the hypothesis on the effect of 
inequality on property rights institutions (Alesina & Perotti, 1996; Rodrick, 1999; Keefer & 
Knack, 2000).   Keefer and Knack (2002) have used income-inequality as a measure of social 
polarisation and shown that countries with high inequality have the least levels of private 
property rights. Next, ethnic divisions can also exert similar effects because they are 
associated with polarised societies. They could also engender conflicts in redistribution 
because different ethnic groups may be more concerned about the prosperity of those from 
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their ethnicity than in society at large. This type of division could fuel political instability and 
weak economic institutions. The findings of Easterly and Levine (1997) and Collier (2000) 
support this thesis. A negative relationship between the quality of institutions and inequality 
has been established by Easterly (2007). Finally, Acemoglu et al. (2005) have suggested three 
potential determinants of institutional quality: the level of democracy, income inequality and 
natural resources. In our estimations, ethnic fragmentation as well as military rule could also 
reflect the above narratives. This confirms the fact that the politico-geographic dimension is 
an important factor in Africa.  
Table 3.Dependent Variable: Property Rights (Heritage Foundation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Judicial  .202***   
(.049)      
.201***   
(.050) 
.200***   
(.049)     
.200***   
(.049)      
.208***   
(.050)      
Independancy  -.462***   
(.136)     
-.477***  
(.137) 
-.468***   
(.136)     
-.471***   
(.136)     
-.496***   
(.138)     
Common law 1.544   
(3.692)      
1.464 
(3.759) 
1.455   
(3.736)      
1.556   
(3.769)      
1.702   
(3.736)      
Military rule -5.857***  
(2.230)     
-5.873***   
(2.261) 
-5.680***   
(2.306)     
-5.861***   
(2.266)     
-5.874***   
(2.236)     
Population (log) -1.808   
(1.399)     
-1.764   
(1.429) 
-1.921   
(1.480)     
-1.779   
(1.428)     
-2.131   
(1.447)     
GDP per capita (log) 1.913   
(1.697)      
1.888   
(1.720) 
1.856   
(1.720)      
1.936   
(1.733)      
1.80     
(1.711)      
EthnicFractionalization 14.023   
(9.297)      
14.095   
(9.504) 
14.266   
(9.455)      
13.864   
(9.466)      
16.099*   
(9.602)      
Polity IV  .005   
 (.040)      
.005 
(.040) 
.005   
(.040)      
.005 
  (.040)      
.006 
   (.040)      
Catholic Religion  .718    
(3.742) 
   
Other Religion   .948   
(3.370)      
  
MuslimsReligion    .334    
(3.675)      
 
Protestants Religion     -7.554   
(6.863)     
Constant  41.837**   
(20.685)      
42.105**   
(20.954) 
42.973   
(21.041)      
41.830**   
(21.226)      
45.70 ** 
(21.056)      
R² within 0.1019                          0.1042 0.1041                          0.1036                          0.1058 
R² between 0.4574                                         0.4509 0.4535                                         0.4529                                        0.4569                                        
R² overall 0.3906                                         0.3853 0.3886                                         0.3869                              0.3923                                        
Obs 278 278 278 278 278 
Method Random-
effects GLS 
regression 
Random-
effects GLS 
regression 
Random-
effects GLS 
regression 
Random-
effects GLS 
regression 
Random-
effects GLS 
regression 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, ***: significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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In Table 3 above, we have changed the measurement of property rights. Some 
conclusions drawn from Table 2 seem invalid. In effect, the colonial independence variable 
which was previously not significant is now weakly significant. However, its instability is 
articulated by a negative sign. Accordingly, the advantage related to experience from colonial 
independence is no longer relevant at this stage. Per capita income has also become 
insignificant. This is equally the case with democracy and the protestant religion. Ethnic 
fragmentation is also no longer significant as before. In effect, it is only significant in the last 
column.  
In Table 4, we attempt to address the issue of endogeneity in per capita income by 
using lagged variables. To this effect, we create two lags of one period and four periods. We 
notice that military rule and judicial variables continue to behave in the same way. The results 
found in Table 3 for the colonial independence variable are persistent. It is largely significant 
with a negative sign. The size of the population is now negatively significant, though the 
relationship is not solid. The behaviour of democracy is consistent with the last-two tables and 
when we consider the Mo Ibrahim index, the effect of the coefficient becomes significant. 
However, it loses its significance if the Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal index is 
used. The protestant religion also appears to have a negative effect on property rights. What is 
strikingly apparent is the direction of the sign of ethnic fragmentation. This variable is 
consistently significant in all estimations. Hence, the hypothesis of a varying effect 
theoretically predicted for this variable is not verified anywhere. The judicial variable and 
military rule indicator appear to be more robust than other variables exploited in this study.  
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Table 4: Dependent Variable: Property Rights  
 Property Rights  
(Fondation Mo Ibrahim) 
Property Rights  
 (Heritage Foundation 
and  Wall Street Journal) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
Judicial  .415*** 
(.024) 
.4151*** 
(.030) 
.208***    
(.050) 
.174***   
(.051) 
Independancy  -.080** 
(.040) 
-.071 
(.057) 
-.494***   
(.138) 
-.290    
(.186) 
Common law .648 
(1.480) 
.871 
(1.886) 
1.723   
3.735) 
.556    
(3.946) 
Military rule -7.923***   
(1.471) 
-9.190*** 
(1.850) 
-5.840***   
(2.239) 
-6.546**   
(3.135) 
Population (log) -2.518***   
(.593) 
-2.613*** 
(.746) 
-2.144   
(1.446) 
-1.469   
(1.516) 
GDP per capita (log) (t-1) -.538 
(.681) 
 1.746   
(1.701) 
 
GDP per capita (log) (t-4)  -.632 
(.871) 
 
 
1.433   
(2.076) 
EthnicFractionalization 18.263*** 
(4.282) 
18.810*** 
(5.393) 
16.040*   
9.593 
6.107   
(9.861) 
Polity IV  .182*** 
(.027) 
.193*** 
(.036) 
.006    
(.040) 
.100   
(.107) 
Protestants Religion -10.758*** 
(3.373) 
-8.818** 
(4.302) 
-7.576   
(6.859) 
-12.321*   
(7.207) 
Constant  52.615*** 
(7.283) 
53.339*** 
(9.201) 
46.176**   
(21.018) 
42.612   
(26.407) 
R²   within 0.6177 0.6386 0.1057 0.0343 
R² between 0.3040 0.1009 0.4563 0.4950 
R² overall 0.6163 0.6269 0.3919 0.4435 
Obs 339 215 278 173 
Method Random-
effects GLS 
regression 
Random-
effects GLS 
regression 
Random-
effects GLS 
regression 
Random-
effects GLS 
regression 
Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, ***: significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
 
5. Concluding implications and future research directions  
 
 The present paper has extended existing property rights literature on entrepreneurship, 
IPRs protection channels and knowledge economy by examining historic, geographic and 
institutional determinants in a sample of 47 Sub-Saharan Africa countries for the period 2000-
2007. Random Effects Generalised Least Squares (GLS) regressions are employed using 
property rights measurements from the Mo Ibrahim and Heritage foundations. The results 
broadly show that ethnic fractionalisation, Polity IV and GDP per capita have positive effects 
on property rights institutions while the following exert negative effects: military rule, the 
Protestant religion, maturity from colonial independence and population density.   
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 The positive effect of GDP per capita implies that development drives IPRs more in 
developed countries, compared to their developing counterparts. As a policy implication, Sub-
Saharan African countries need less stringent IPRs because they are at the early stage of 
industrialisation. However, as their GDP per capita incomes grow, more stringent IPRs would 
need to be adopted. This is consistent with the fact that the current technology in Africa is 
more imitative and adaptive in nature. Hence, the sub-region should be adapted to copying 
commodities that are technology-intensive because at its current stage of industrialisation, its 
technology is more imitative and adaptive. In essence, innovation and development policies 
that are tailored towards supporting less stringent property rights are relevant for enhanced 
know-how and reversed engineering. This policy direction is broadly consistent with a strand 
of recent African knowledge economy literature which maintains that less stringent IPRs can 
boost scientific publications (Asongu, 2014c) and inclusive development (Asongu, 2014d). 
Hence, policies that encourage less stringent IPRs would go a long way to increasing living 
standards and reducing poverty in the post-2015 sustainable development agenda. Conversely,   
as countries in the sub-region develop industrially and their per capita incomes increase, more 
stringent IPRs would need to be adopted.  
 We have also established that Polity IV positively affects property rights institutions. 
This confirms previous findings that have used Polity IV as a measurement of property rights 
institutions (see Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Ali, 2013).  Asongu (2014e) has criticised 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Ali by arguing that Polity IV was originally designed as a 
measurement of the durability of political systems and later broadened to incorporate regime 
type. While we agree with Asongu (2014e) that the measurement is more favourable to 
advanced countries that are characterised with more stable and democratic political regimes, it 
is also important to acknowledge that encouraging more Western-oriented political 
institutions would create suitable conditions for property rights institutions that are essential 
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for investment, employment, economic growth and poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The narrative underlying the effect and corresponding policy implications also explains why 
the impact of military rule on property rights is negative.  
 The fact that maturity from colonial independence has a negative effect on property 
rights institutions should not be construed as ‘colonial independence’ being a bad 
process/event for the continent. Like many developed countries which were once colonised 
but now enjoy strong property rights institutions, we believe that the relationship can be 
Kuznets shape such that as countries in the sub-region mature in colonial independence they 
would also enjoy strong IPRs as they develop in terms of per capita income. This narrative is 
consistent with the time and level hypotheses for the benefits of political institutions, notably, 
in: Turkey (Sayari, 1977), India (Wade, 1985), many countries in Africa (Lemarchand, 1972) 
and Latin America (Weyland, 1998) and post-1990 communist countries like Russia (Varsee, 
1997). It should be noted that immediately after independence, countries in the sub-region 
experienced lost decades in economic prosperity and per capita income growth (see Fofack, 
2014). This note builds on the established finding that per capita income is positively 
associated with property rights institutions.  
 The negative effect of the protestant religion (which somewhat contradicts the 
traditional positive association between the ‘protestant ethic’ and development of private 
rights) may be traceable to the fact that Western religions are mixed with traditional animist 
cultures is most African countries. Moreover, the inherent entrepreneurial culture in the 
protestant ethic (that builds on the need to create businesses and institutions for private gain) 
has lost its original significance in Africa because most protestant churches are fundamentally 
motivated by the need to preach and practice Jesus’ teachings in a different way, while 
simultaneous espousing the idea that being poor is a path to paradise.  
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 Whereas the findings have strong implications for countries in the sub-region currently 
on the path to knowledge-based economies, future research can improve the existing literature 
by directly assessing the relationship between property rights institutions and knowledge 
economy. To this end, the World Bank’s four dimensions of the Knowledge economy index 
can be engaged, namely: education, institutional regime and economic incentives, information 
and communication technology and innovation.  
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